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The article examines the role and place of faith in the concept of Vladimir Solovyov who is 
considered to be the creator of the first Russian philosophical system. The purpose of the arti-
cle is to determine the epistemological and methodological significance of faith in Solovyov’s 
understanding as a special factor of cognition. In order to study this problem, a synthetic 
method of reconstruction of the thought of Solovyov as well as a method of philosophical 
analysis was used. First, Solovyov’s project of integral knowledge or free theosophy is pre-
sented, i. e. synthesis of philosophy, theology, and science. The suppositions of this concept 
are revealed and its polemical context is indicated, namely, Solovyov’s attempt to overcome 
the abstract or one-sided principles: reason, empirical experience, and faith in order to create 
an integral system that should unite all types of knowledge. In addition, philosophy as such 
corresponds to reason, science to experience, and theology to faith. The second part of the 
article is devoted to the epistemological aspects of faith in the concept of integral knowledge. 
It lies in the fact that each act of cognition begins with the assertion of the objective existence 
of its object, which Solovyov describes as faith in a broad sense of the word. Thus, faith has 
a universal significance as a necessary condition for the cognitive process. The third part of 
the article discusses the methodological aspect of faith as a key link in the system of integral 
knowledge. As a result, faith has a dominant role not only in theology, but in all spheres of 
knowledge, including philosophy and science. Thus, it is possible to conclude that there is no 
conflict between faith and reason; on the contrary, they complement each other. Solovyov’s 
position is still relevant nowadays.
Keywords: faith, integral knowledge, theosophy, experience, science.
Vladimir Solovyov (1853–1900) is considered to be the first “professional” Russian 
philosopher and the creator of an original concept of religious thought, described by the 
terms of all-unity, sophiology and divine humanity (Godmanhood). In his early youth he 
shared the ideas of materialism and atheism, but under the influence of the holistic con-
cept of Spinoza (who was his “first love in the domain of philosophy” [1, p. 29]), Solovyov 
returned to Christianity and started working on his own original project of the reconcilia-
tion of faith and reason. Indeed, by 1872 “the Orthodox faith regained strength in his soul 
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and it is interesting to note that unlike the typical case his abandoned scientism was in a 
special way combined with his restored religious faith” [2, p. 51]. On December 31, 1872 
he wrote to his friend Ekaterina Romanova: 
your present error <…> is that you are confusing faith in general with one of its forms: with 
blind, childish, unconscious faith, and that you think there’s no other faith. Of course, one doesn’t 
need that much intelligence to refute such a faith — I rejected it when I was thirteen years old. Of 
course, no person who is to any extent a thinking person can believe in the same manner as when 
he was a child; and if this is a person with a superficial or limited mind, he does not go further than 
this easy rejection of his childish faith, fully certain that his nanny’s fairy tales or elementary phrases 
of the catechism represent true religion, true Christianity <…>. And although God is one and the 
same, the faith to which more philosophy leads us is not the same as the faith a little mind leads us 
away from. It is not hard to see that the faith of a conscious, thinking Christian differs in some man-
ner from the faith of an old peasant woman even though the objects of faith are the same in the two 
cases and both might be true Christians; and the inner sense of faith in the two is the same [3, p. 80].
The Solovyovian goal can be presented as an attempt to rationalize the mysteries of 
faith. He believed that in order to make the traditional Christian faith attractive to con-
temporary people, it was necessary to express it in proper philosophical terms and show 
that there is no conflict between religion and philosophy or religion and science. This 
reconciliation of theology, philosophy, and science was described by Solovyov as a theory 
of integral knowledge or “free theosophy”. As will be illustrated, faith serves as the first and 
most important principle for Solovyov at both the epistemological and methodological 
levels of integral knowledge. 
The Context of the Solovyovian Project of Integral Knowledge
Solovyov, in the spirit of the Platonic and Spinozan traditions, was inclined to em-
phasize the organic unity of different fragments of reality and its cognition. In par-
ticular, he tried to unite the various branches of knowledge that were supposed to be 
separated from each other. For instance, science, according to the radical positivistic 
interpretation, ignored any non-empirical (metaphysical and religious) factors. In turn, 
the most influential speculative philosophical systems of his time, such as Hegelianism, 
denied both empirical and mystical experience and tried to replace religion with phi-
losophy. Eventually, the traditional Orthodox confession neglected scientific data and 
philosophical investigations. Solovyov postulated that theology should be expressed in 
the form of rational reflection as well as maintaining close contact with modern scien-
tific discoveries. 
In order to overcome this crisis of science, on the one side, and religion, on the 
other, he proposed his concept of integral knowledge: the alliance of philosophy, sci-
ence, and theology in which faith is the element that allows us to know and create the 
integral vision of reality. In the draft of his unfinished work titled God is all. All becomes 
God, Solovyov wrote: “All affairs and activity of humanity must bring into harmony 
or all-inclusive relationship which is expressed in <…> the theoretical sphere as free 
theosophy” [4, p. 21], or integral knowledge. Integral knowledge is also in tune with the 
Solovyovian ontological concept of all-unity. In his opinion, the ontological link of all 
beings provides epistemological fullness. In other words, the objective aspect of real-
ity (from the side of its metaphysical nature) treated as an organic organism leads to 
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the certitude of its subjective (form the side of knowing subject) perception. Solovyov 
stressed that all branches of knowledge are of a complementary nature and need each 
other. Only by taking into account various perspectives — religious, philosophical, and 
scientific  — are we able to discover the inner truth of the universe, both uncreated 
(God) and created (the world). In this way, Solovyov proposed the internal unity of faith 
and reason. What is more, it was faith, in the Solovyovian understanding of this notion, 
which determines the act of cognition. This applies not not only to religion, but also to 
science and philosophical matters.
In this context, it worth mentioning the essay by Solovyov entitled Faith, Reason 
and Experience [5]. This is a remarkable example of his polemic with radical empiricism 
(positivism) and radical idealism (Hegelianism, both of “right” and “left” wings). The 
article was written in 1877, the same time when Solovyov had been working on his sem-
inal (yet unfinished) book The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge and started 
writing his doctoral dissertation — Critique of Abstract Principles (published in 1880) 
as well as delivering his Lectures on Divine Humanity. Hence, the essay Faith, Reason 
and Experinece reflects early yet extremely mature Solovyovian studies concerning vari-
ous fields of philosophy (especially ontology, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and 
philosophy of science). At that time, he sought conceptions that might be an alternative 
for the defective principles of fideism, pure rationalism, and pure empiricism. This idea 
is encapsulated by the key words of the title of Solovyov’s essay: “faith,” “reason,” and 
“experience”. The article ends with the announcement of a continuation, which did not 
appear during Solovyov’s lifetime for unknown reasons. The entire text of Faith, Reason 
and Experience was published in the journal “Voprosy filosofii” (“Issues of Philosophy”) 
in 1994 [6], and then reprinted in the third volume of the Collected Works by V. Solovyov 
in 2001.
Most likely, the publication of the Solovyovian article Faith, Reason and Experience in 
“Grazhdanin” was made possible thanks to Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881), who was the 
editor of this journal from 1873–1874 [7, p. 515] and whom the philosopher cooperated 
with. Nonetheless, the essay Faith, Reason and Experience did not generate much enthusi-
asm among the journal’s readers. What is more, the well-known and influential publicist 
and philosopher Nicolas Strakhov (1828–1896), in his letter to Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) 
from 24–27.12.1877, felt that the Solovyovian text was unclear: “The small spark of philo-
sophical work is dissolved in a disordered stream of words”. Fortunately, the negative criti-
cism did not discourage Tolstoy, who showed a keen interest in the subject and asked his 
correspondent to send him the text of Solovyov’s piece. 
The article by Solovyov is an important voice concerning the relationship between 
faith and knowledge (in the broadest sense of these terms), about which his continuator, 
Semen Frank, wrote as follows in 1910: “The topic of the relationship between religion 
and science, knowledge and faith, becomes the most pressing problem of the Western 
European religious movement — in contrast to the Russian movement, which, due to the 
underdevelopment of our scientific thinking and our national contempt for exact knowl-
edge, looked down on science from the very beginning” [8, p. 386–387].
Although Solovyov was not the first Russian philosopher who addressed the rela-
tionship between faith and knowledge, he was certainly the first to propose a very con-
crete and original solution to this problem in the shape of a system of integral knowledge. 
Despite the general “underdevelopment of scientific thinking” mentioned by Frank, in 
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nineteenth-century Russia there was a strong and influential group of positivists and ma-
terialists who denied any meaning for faith. It was Solovyov who, in discussion with the 
aforementioned trends, initiated the “Russian movement”, as Frank called it — a peculiar 
model of “revival of religion and understanding of religion” [8, p. 385].
Perhaps Strakhow was right: Solovyov’s essay Faith, Reason and Experinece is a bit 
“talkative”. The whole text could be summarized in two sentences:
(1) Faith, reason and experience are “incommensurable proportions,” i. e. they be-
long to different orders of cognition and are irreducible to one another. 
(2) Despite their distinctiveness, all three categories need each other.
The direct context (or rather a pretext) of Solovyov’s essay was provided by a polemic 
with the famous book by David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874), the representative of “left-
wing” Hegelianism, entitled The Old Faith and the New: A Confession which amounted 
to the creed of the German philosopher. Strauss, one of the most determined critics of 
Christianity, interpreted the person of Christ in his work The Life of Jesus exclusively as 
a historical person (historischer Jesus), and saw the descriptions of miracles as mythical 
stories. As John Hedley Brooke reports in his book Science and Religion. Some Historical 
Perspectives, for Strauss, 
It would be far better to acknowledge the historical process whereby reports of the original 
incidents had been affected by the passing of time, by the accretion of legend, and by human in-
terpretation. <…> Playing off the rationalists against the harmonists, Strauss showed how neither 
the naturalism of the former nor the supernaturalism of the latter did justice to the gospels as 
historical documents. <…> The science of history had created a watershed. One set of presuppo-
sitions took one toward a human, but historically elusive Christ. The other — more traditional — 
allowed the retention of the Christ of faith, but at the cost of severing one’s ties with what Strauss 
called ‘our modern world’ [9, p. 362–363, 366]. 
In Solovyov’s opinion, Strauss in order to be consistent should have avoided the term 
“faith” completely, using instead the words “reason” or “knowledge”. Meanwhile, the no-
tion “faith” appears in the very title and throughout the entire content of Strauss’ book, 
who describes his position as a “new faith”. This means that faith is an irremovable element 
of the human spirit and his entire existence. 
The Epistemological Aspect
As we have already mentioned, Solovyov developed his own proposal for overcom-
ing the previous, one-sidedness of solutions from the metaphysical, epistemological, 
and methodological point of view in his works titled Critique of Abstract Principles, The 
Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge and Lectures on Divine Humanity. Specifi-
cally, in the onto-gnoseological aspect, Solovyov viewed faith, reason and experience 
as three stages of every process of cognition. He elaborated the ambitious metaphysical 
system of all-unity which was supposed to be the “inner”, organic unity of all beings. 
Based on this, he tried to justify the concept of integral knowledge, positing an “ex-
ternal” alliance of philosophy, theology and science. Also, in the article Faith, Reason 
and Experience discussed here, Solovyov stressed that we first learn about phenomena 
through external experience, then, reason derives from the detailed, transient empiri-
cal data some general concepts, while faith concerns the foundations and principles of 
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these empirical facts. In his Lectures on Divine Humanity, the philosopher expressed 
this thought in the following way: 
If material reality, perceived by our external senses, represents in itself only contingent and 
transitory phenomena, but not autonomous entities or foundations of being, these latter <…> 
must have their own being independent of phenomena. Consequently, to know them as actual 
we need a special mode of thought activity, which we shall call by a term already known in phi-
losophy: intellectual intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung, Intuition). This activity constitutes the 
primordial form of true knowledge, a form that is clearly distinguished from sense perception 
and experience, as well as from rational, or abstract, thinking [10, p. 60]. 
In turn, in his Critique of Abstract Principles, Solovyov wrote: “In any cognition, an 
object exists for us in a triple way: first, as relatively real in its actual influence on us, that 
is, in its real phenomenon; second, as relatively ideal in its mental relations to everything; 
and finally, third, as an absolute object. We experience certain interactions of the object, 
think of its general characteristics and are sure of its independent, that is, absolute exist-
ence” [11, p. 291].
Solovyov tries to explain both the fact of cognition of the constant features of things 
and the possibility of capturing their changing properties (in Aristotle’s language — sub-
stance and accidents). In the very process of cognition, he distinguishes three phases. At 
first, the subject perceives a thing as an independent being. The philosopher calls this 
stage “faith” or “mystical knowledge”: “We believe that the object is”. In the second phase, 
the subject recognizes the idea of the object due to their mutual internal connection of 
the object and subject in the absolute. Solovyov describes this process by means of the 
terms “imagination,” “intellectual intuition” (Intellectuelle Anschauung), or “intellectual 
contemplation”. As a result, we know “what an object is”. Finally, in the last stage described 
as “mental creation,” the idea is expressed in the form of a phenomenon that is currently 
perceived at the empirical, external level. Thus, “creativity” informs us “how the object 
manifests itself ” [11, p. 303–305]. Solovyov warns us that the above-mentioned order of 
cognition is only of a “genetical” character, occurring in ordine essendi, while in ordine 
cognoscendi we first perceive the phenomenon, and only through it can we reach the es-
sence of being. Hence, every object of cognition has three modes: in the phase of “faith” it 
is given as “what absolutely exists” (ens, οντως ον), at the stage of “imagination” — as an 
eternal “being” or “idea” (essentia, ουσία), and in the phase of “creativity” — as a current 
“phenomenon” (actus, phaenomenon) [11, p. 305]. To begin with, we believe in the real 
existence of an object of knowledge, then we apprehend its essence and, finally, its manifes-
tation as phenomena, empirical data [12, p. 78]. 
Konstanty Mochulsky (1892–1948) noticed that Solovyov adopted the three-stage 
scheme of cognition from his teacher Pamfil Yurkievich (1827–1874). In his opinion, 
Yurkievich’s “religious feeling,” “mystical contemplation” and “experience” find their 
equivalents in Solovyov’s “faith”, “imagination” and “creativity”. Undoubtedly, one could 
observe a certain similarity between theses two concepts, but, as Mochulsky himself ad-
mited, “Solovyov inserts a new content into Yurkievich’s scheme” [13, p. 125]. While in 
Yurkievich’s case “religious feeling” had a more practical and ascetic meaning, in tune with 
the venerable Eastern Christian doctrine of “cardiognosy,” the Solovyovian counterpart 
of this notion — “faith” — is rather of a theoretical character, although also the author of 
Critique of Abstract Principles was not alien to the idea that the reality is “known to the 
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heart” [14, p. 184]. It should be recalled that “faith” as a cognitive category was already 
present in the teaching of the Slavophiles: Ivan Kireyevsky (1806–1856) and Alexei Kho-
miakov (1804–1860), who also had a considerable influence on the young Solovyov [15, 
p. 559–579]. However, while the Slavophiles considered “faith” as an integral moment of 
intellect as such (labeled by them as “believing reason”), Solovyov sees “faith” as the first 
stage which precedes learning about “what the object is”. In other words, faith is the pre-
supposition and condition of every act of cognition. 
Empirical experience and the act of reason refer respectively to phenomena and 
their metaphysical foundations (essences, resp. ideas) and enable the construction of 
general, abstract notions, while the act of faith captures the thing itself as an objectively 
existing, independent being: “faith reveals to us the ruthlessness and substance of the 
object of cognition” [16, p. 228] by expressing the “non-religious openness of being to 
the human spirit” [17, p. 118]. In this very sense, faith plays a fundamental role in the 
entire cognitive process. Faith is not only reserved for the domain of religion but is 
present in every sphere of human knowledge. “Mystical perception <…> can only be 
explained when we admit that in perceiving ourselves in God, we at the same time per-
ceive all other objects or beings” [18, p. 528]. Faith, therefore, does not contradict reason 
in any way, but it is the foundation, the initial stage of our perception and understand-
ing of reality. Solovyov describes faith with the help of the folloving metaphor: “The 
branches of the tree cross and combine in different ways, whereby these these branches 
and leaves touch one another by their external side. It is symbolizes the external knowl-
edge (i. e., the empirical one. — T. O.). But the same branches and leaves are connected 
by their common trunk and roots which deliver vital juices to them. This is the mystical 
knowledge or faith” [11, p. 296].
As we have already mentioned, Solovyovv was fascinated in his youth by the work of 
Spinoza. It is possible that in his theory of cognition the Russian philosopher consciously 
refers to his thought, adopting the Spinozian doctrine of three kinds of knowledge: “opin-
ion” or “imagination,” due to which “we have notions common to all men, and adequate 
ideas of the properties of things” [19], “reason” (ratio or cognitio), and “intuition” (scientia 
intuitiva). Indeed, in both cases the knowledge of external things (which Spinoza treated 
as a modi of God’s attributes, and Solovyov, in turn, as rooted in the absolute) means, 
ultimately, the knowledge of the divine reality. However, there is an important difference 
between the two thinkers. All three Spinozian “kinds of knowledge” concern only the 
degree of adequacy of cognition: “knowledge of the first kind we have <…> assigned all 
those ideas, which are inadequate and confused,” while “to the second and third kinds 
of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true 
idea of true and false” [19]. In contrast, the above-presented Solovyovian stages of cogni-
tion — especially the second and third — are not only the ways of cognition, but also ways 
for the ontological transformation of the essences of beings embedded in the absolute. As 
a result, the cognitive approach of beings in the form of intelligible ideas and empirical 
phenomena is possible. 
Generally speaking, the Eastern Christian religious-mystical tradition is met with an 
attempt to rational justification of cognition in the style of modern Western philosophy 
in Solovyov’s epistemology. The Russian thinker wants to harmonize the teaching on the 
direct approach of the trans-empirical, divine reality with the requirements of critical, 
post-Kantian thought. Every cognitive act means moving into the sphere of all-unity. So-
466 Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2020. Т. 36. Вып. 3
lovyov expressed this thought in the following way: “We imagine a choice not between 
transcendent and immanent kinds of cognition, but between transcendent cognition and 
the negation of any kind of cognition” [20, p. 103]. In this respect, the outstanding histo-
rian of Russian philosophy Vasilii Zenkovsky (1881–1962) described Solovyov’s concepts 
as “transcendental realism” [21, p. 123–124].
The Methodological Aspect
Solovyov treats faith, reason and experience as correlates of religion, philosophy and 
science. Taken separately, these elements, which determine the mystical, rational and em-
pirical cognition respectively, are termed “abstract principles,” i. e. detached from any con-
nection with others and, as a consequence, lead to extreme forms of fideism, rationalism 
and empiricism. Therefore, Solovyov put forward the aforementioned postulate of unifica-
tion of faith, reason and experience (theology, philosophy and science) in the system of 
integral knowledge. 
What is more, the various factors or stages of cognition can also be considered as 
representatives of various fields of knowledge. Namely, “faith” which informs about the 
independent existence of the object, plays a special role in theology, attesting to the 
presence of the divine sphere. “Intellectual intuition” or “imagination”, explaining “what 
a subject is”, is a privileged means of philosophy, while “creativity”, which enables access 
to reality through a phenomenon, finds its application in positive science. According to 
Solovyov, in extreme cases (such as positivism, rationalism and fideism) the aforemen-
tioned principles obtain an “abstract” character which results in the abandonment of 
objective knowledge. Neither positive science, based on the perception of phenomena, 
nor Hegelian rationalistic philosophy, nor traditional Orthodox theology, based purely 
on faith in God, can capture all aspects of the real metaphysical principle, i. e. all-unity. 
Since the very process of cognition is a synthesis of faith, intellectual intuition and crea-
tivity, its terminus ad quaem, i. e. knowledge itself, should be a synthesis of theology, 
philosophy and science — the fields in which the above-mentioned ways of cognition 
are reflected. 
In order to build a system of integral knowledge, or free theosophy, there is no need 
to add any new element, it is sufficient to carry out a structural reorganization of existing 
fields of knowledge. As George Florovsky (1893–1979) remarked, “the falsehood of any 
judgment, confirmation or evaluation was seen not in its positive content, not in its nature 
(physis), but in its nonobligatory position (thesis) in the system of knowledge, i. e. in the 
incompleteness or one-sidedness” [22, p. 110]. According to Vyacheslav Moiseev, integral 
knowledge has a holomorphic character: “the parts of the whole potentially contain the 
whole itself and this whole can be recreated from them” [23, p. 54]. In other words, poten-
tially, philosophy, theology and science can be considered — pars pro toto — as integral 
knowledge or free theosophy.
Solovyov most probably borrowed the term “theosophy” from Jakob Boehme, al-
though he gave it his own meaning. The Russian thinker wanted to stress that the goal of 
the new system of knowledge relies on knowing God (hence, “theosophy” — “divine wis-
dom”), while retaining, at the same time, the relative independence of the “secular” fields 
of knowledge (hence, “free theosophy”). Let us consider the second name for the Solovyo-
vian program — “integral knowledge”. It is not difficult to notice that Solovyov refers to 
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the works of the Slavophiles, especially those of Ivan Kireevsky, who proclaimed “integral 
knowledge” to be based on the “new principles of philosophy” [24]. Solovyov’s think-
ing also reflects the so-called academic philosophy: the concepts of the above-mentioned 
Pamfil Yurkevich, and the “patriarch of Russian theism” Fedor Golubinsky (1797–1854), 
who thought about two aims of cognition: love of human wisdom (“philosophy”) and 
divine Wisdom (“theosophy”) [25, p. 49]. 
On the one hand, Solovyov writes about the equality of all components of the inte-
gral philosophy (resp. free theosophy)  — the mystical, rational and empirical element. 
On the other hand, he clearly stresses that the leading position belongs to theology which 
captures “the absolute existence and the absolute essence of things” [11, p. 308]. Solovyov 
was convinced that “mysticism plays a role of supreme importance in this synthesis, and 
therefore he was especially anxious to delineate the distinguishing features of mystical 
apprehension” [26, p. 100], or faith. But mystical cognition itself is one-sided in nature. 
Therefore, theology should be wrapped in a form of rational thinking and maintain close 
contact with empirical data, which allows traditional theism to be replaced with “free 
theosophy”. It is worth noting that such a tendency to create all-embracing systems, also 
in the sphere of epistemology, is a characteristic feature not only of Solovyov’s work, but 
Russian religious philosophy in general.
Conclusion
Let us quote Solovyov’s words which come from his entry “Faith (Philosophical)” 
written for the famous Russian edition of The Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Diction-
ary: “The foundations of faith lie deeper than knowledge and thinking, hence it is a pri-
mordial fact in relation to them. <…> [Faith] is a more or less direct or indirect, simple 
or complex, manifestation of the pre-reflective relationship between the subject and the 
object in consciousness” [27, p. 553].
Hence, faith reveals the existential dimension of beings. By emphasizing this, So-
lovyov provides an expression of so-called ontologism, i. e., “the primacy of the concept of 
being over that of consciousness or knowledge” which “may be considered as a typically 
national trait of Russian philosophical thought” [28, p. 7, 10]. “Faith”, understood as an 
approach to the existential aspect of the object, opens the way to its further description 
in rational and empirical categories and thus constitutes a conditio sine qua non of any 
cognition. Faith is an antidote to all manifestations of skepticism, which undermines the 
possibility of achieving true knowledge, as well as the deficiencies of “abstract” directions 
of empiricism and rationalism, neglecting the cognitive understanding of the objective 
principle of existence.
Opponents of Solovyov, such as Boris Chiczerin (1828–1904) in his work Mysti-
cism in Science, accused him of the fact that in order to state the real existence of things 
it is not necessary to refer to the religious principle, i. e. faith, since ordinary external 
experience is enough [29, p. 141–142]. The question arises: why does Solovyov intro-
duce the element of faith into his theory of cognition? Before we answer it, let us note 
that treating faith as a certainty about the real existence of a thing, which enables its 
further cognition, was not only criticized by Solovyov’s contemporaries. It also received 
a lively approval from other Russian thinkers. It is worth looking at their proposals, 
which shed some light on the views of Solovyov himself. For instance, Sergei Trubetskoy 
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(1862–1905) almost literally repeated Solovyovian thought in his work The Foundations 
of Idealism (1896): 
Faith as an inevitable element of our sensual and rational cognition <…> convinces us of the 
reality of the external world, the reality of the objects of the senses and reason <…> Thus, there 
is no impassable gap between religious faith and that faith, which is the fundamental principle 
of our cognition, because the object of one and the other has a common term — “being”, <…> 
Although the tasks and ways of cognition in religion and philosophy are different, there is no 
contradiction between them [30, p. 581]. 
As we can see, “faith” has a very broad meaning for Trubetskoy and Solovyov. It ex-
presses certainty about the existence of any object of cognition — both empirical things 
and God. In short, Russian thinkers tried to make an analogy between “faith” in an epis-
temic aspect and religious faith. After all, Solovyov insists that his programme of rebuild-
ing metaphysics (from the position of ontological and epistemological realism) was en-
tirely subordinated to his aspirations to express religious truths in philosophical terms. 
The emphasis on the existential aspect of being was dictated not only by this philosophical 
(epistemological and ontological) goal, but also by the project of applying philosophy to 
the theological discourse. It is here that Solovyov follows in the footsteps of Schelling, who 
in his “positive philosophy” (contrary to the purely rational “negative” philosophy from 
the first period) stemmed from the experience of God. In such an approach, the terminus 
a quo of philosophy is not a formal rational principle, detached from the actual reality, 
but an existential moment, expressed by “faith” in the broadest meaning of the word [31, 
p. 286]. “Faith” allows divine reality to be captured and which, in Solovyov’s opinion, also 
includes an empirical sphere. As a special cognitive disposition, faith precedes rational 
reflection. It is the initial stage not only of knowledge of God, but also of knowledge of 
the world. Consequently, “The existence of God, like all existence in general, may only be 
given through a ‘leap of faith,’ an immanent vision, and this leap of faith must be the start-
ing point for all philosophy. It is only religious experience, mystical intuition, which can 
justify the objective reality of the idea of the Absolute. But its role does not cease there. It 
is also this intuition, and it alone that reveals the positive content of this idea” [32, р. 20].
In his Lectures on Divine Humanity Solovyov claims: “The complete and absolute 
certainty of its (God’s and any object’s at all. — T. O.) existence can be given only by faith. 
<…> That reality is, we believe, but what it is, we experience and know” [10, p. 30–31]. 
At the same time, faith is not self-sufficient, because determining the positive con-
tent of being also requires the participation of rational and empirical elements. Solovyov 
explains that faith, reason and experience do not contradict each other, but are comple-
mentary factors of the cognitive process and, more broadly, of all kinds of knowledge 
as such. 
In this case, there should be no conflict between faith and reason which is a step 
further in the cognitive process. Thanks to faith, the primary cognitive approach to God 
(which has a special significance for theology) as well as the presentation of things as ex-
isting (which, in turn, is a starting point of philosophical and scientific undertaking, not 
to mention colloquial cognition) is possible. Faith understood in this way is a “praphe-
nomenon of both religion and science” [33, p. 15]. The following statement by Solovyov 
illustrates this idea: “It is doubtful that a thinker negating the reality of the external world 
would devote himself to physics” [34, p. 297]. Of course, the thesis on the real existence of 
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the world is of a strictly metaphysical character: “physics does not discuss the problem of 
existence; it simply presupposes that the subject-matter of its investigation does exist” [35, 
p. 10]. Solovyov was aware that
No astronomy could prove to us the sun’s existence and not require any confirmation of its 
certainty from astronomical theories. The task of science as regards this object consists only in 
giving us new, clearer, more precise, and more complete concepts of that combination of phe-
nomena which we call the sun. The question of whether some reality that exists outside our 
consciousness corresponds to these phenomena and concepts, this question of the existence of the 
object is in no way posed or resolved by science, which is concerned only with the relationship 
among phenomena [1, p. 40]. 
At the same time, Solovyov highlights the fact that scientists accept the real, objective 
existence of objects examined by them exclusively through faith. This position expresses a 
strong ontological realism confessed by Solovyov, the epistemological expression of which 
is to be faith. Its task is to show the objective foundation of reality. What is more, “af-
firming an epistemological fideism, Solov’ëv asserted that the start of the true scientific 
endeavor is a faith in science” [36, p. 108].
Faith as a condition (or stage) of cognition is a kind of bridge that connects all 
kinds of knowledge and expresses the links between them. It is not by chance that the 
“integral knowledge” postulated by Solovyov is to be based on the positive religious 
principles — a “mystical cognition,” also known as faith. For Solovyov, “the relationship 
between faith and reason was, in a way, a condition of his philosophy, because, on the 
one hand, he sought to create a philosophical system which would be favorable for the 
understanding of faith, in accordance with the expectations of contemporary conscious-
ness, and, on the other hand, one which would prove, with the help of this philosophical 
system, that the highest demands of the heart and reason are fulfilled precisely by the 
Christian religion” [37, p. 80]. 
Many scholars noticed that the concept of integral knowledge proposed by Solovyov 
has many shortcomings. For instance, Lev Lopatin (1855–1920) observed that Solovyov
held that the philosopher <…> will obtain real knowledge only when he has, living in his 
spirit, this power of higher contemplation of what is truly real in himself. This realistic faith in a 
spiritual world, explains the vitality, integrity and concrete character of Solovyov’s system. The 
same faith, however, may be held responsible for its chief defect. <…> Solovyov failed to dif-
ferentiate between statements actually possessing the necessary logical certainty and statements 
that were merely probable or even possible or conceivable only. In this characteristic defect of So-
lovyov’s philosophy one can see the peculiarity of a poet’s mind: since for a poet the general idea 
of his work, and all the details and particulars of its realisation are both equally dear [38, p. 436].
At the same time, as Vasilii Zenkovsky rightly noticed, the very idea of synthesis 
of religion, philosophy and science had a powerful influence on the later development 
of the original Russian thought [39, p. 245]. Solovyov “did not believe that ‘faith’ and 
‘reason’ were intrinsically incompatible, nor could he agree with Auguste Comte that 
‘religion’ had been superseded by ‘methaphysics’ in the course of the intellectual evo-
lution of mankind. <…> There is no sharp division between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ 
knowledge. Knowledge is inescapably ‘religious’ because it fulfills its function only if 
it succeeds in relating every particular or partial information to the absolute center of 
reality” [31, p. 283–284, 286].
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The Solovyovian postulate of the “universal synthesis of science, philosophy, and reli-
gion” was supposed to affirm the “ultimate necessary result of the Western philosophical 
development” in “the form of rational knowledge, the same truths that have been affirmed 
in the form of faith and spiritual contemplation” [40, p. 49]. Nevertheless, it was faith that 
determines every process of cognition and integral knowledge as a whole.
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В статье рассматриваются роль и место веры в концепции создателя первой русской 
философской системы В. С. Соловьева. Цель исследования состоит в том, чтобы опре-
делить эпистемологическое и  методологическое значение веры в  понимании Соло-
вьева как особого фактора познания. Для этого использованы синтетический метод, 
позволяющий реконструировать мысль Соловьева, а также метод философского ана-
лиза. Вначале представлен соловьевский проект цельного знания, или вольной тео- 
софии, т. е. синтеза философии, богословия и науки. Раскрыты предпосылки этой кон-
цепции и  указан ее полемический контекст, а  именно попытка преодоления отвле-
* Статья подготовлена в ходе проведения работы в рамках Программы фундаментальных ис-
следований Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики» (НИУ 
ВШЭ) и с использованием средств субсидии в рамках государственной поддержки ведущих универ-
ситетов Российской Федерации «5–100».
472 Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2020. Т. 36. Вып. 3
ченных, т. е. односторонних, начал: разума, эмпирического опыта и веры — с целью 
создания системы, объединяющей все виды знания. При этом разуму как таковому 
соответствует философия, опыту — наука, а вере — богословие. Вторая часть статьи 
посвящена эпистемологическому аспекту веры в теории цельного знания. Он заклю-
чается в том, что каждый акт познания начинается с утверждения существования его 
предмета, которое Соловьев называет верой в  широком смысле этого слова. Таким 
образом, вера приобретает универсальное значение как необходимое условие позна-
вательного процесса. В третьей части рассматривается методологический аспект веры 
как ключевого звена в системе цельного знания. Из этого следует, что вере принадле-
жит главенствующая роль не только в богословии, но во всех областях знания, в том 
числе философии и  науке. Таким образом, можно сделать вывод, что между верой 
и разумом нет конфликта, напротив, они взаимодополняют друг друга. Позиция Со-
ловьева актуальна и в наши дни.
Ключевые слова: вера, цельное знание, теософия, опыт, наука.
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